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Participatory Relief Management: 
The Experience of the Relief Society of Tigray 
This paper discusses the experiences of 
the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) and 
the people of rural Tigray during the 
Ethiopian famine of 1984-85. This experi- 
ence was unique and has not been widely 
publicized internationally. 
Despite war and drought, in 1985 
there was a system in Tigray for provid- 
ing assistance to vidims of the Ethiopian 
famine. This system was based on a part- 
nership between REST, various civilian 
departments of the Tigrayan People's 
Liberation Front (TPLF) and local com- 
munities who were directly involved in 
decision making and implementation of 
the relief operation. Although there was 
very little international assistance from 
mid-1984 to late 1985 at the height of the 
famine, which took a terrible toll on the 
lives and livelihood of rural people, this 
participatory form of relief management 
enabled the Tigrayans to survive the 
worst period in their history, and to 
move forward and rebuild their lives. 
In this paper, I will concentrate on the 
events and policy decisions that led to 
the organized exodus of some 200,000 
Tigrayans to eastern Sudan, beginning 
in October 1984, and their repatriation to 
Tigray between 1985 and 1987. How- 
ever, to begin I will provide a brief back- 
ground to the context we were operating 
in at the time of the famine. Finally I will 
consider some of the main issues arising 
from the events considered here. 
Background 
The Relief Society of Tigray was founded 
as a humanitarian organization in 1978, 
three years after the war between the 
central government of Mengistu Haile 
Mariam and the Tigrayan People's Lib- 
eration Front began. REST's mandate 
was to assist drought- and war-affected 
people living in the areas of Tigray under 
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the control and administration of the 
TPLF. After 1980, a few northern non- 
governmental organizations gave REST 
a small amount of funds, for purchasing 
grain surpluses in the western part of 
Tigray. REST redistributed the grain to 
drought-affected regions. REST also op- 
erated a small fleet of trucks to transport 
emergency food aid from Sudan across 
the border to western Tigray. 
Unfortunately, this cross-border 
operation was insufficient in meeting the 
requirements of the rural population, 
many of whom were forced by consecu- 
tive years of drought and failed harvests 
to sell off their assets for food. The 
drought has intensified and the war es- 
calated. Between 1980 and 1985 the 
Ethiopian government launched five 
major ground and air offensives against 
rural areas under the control of the TPLF. 
These offensives gravely exacerbated the 
effects of drought by disrupting food 
production. Tens of thousands of dis- 
placed people were added to the grow- 
ing number of those displaced due to 
drought. The war also severely con- 
strained the relief operation. REST deliv- 
ered and distributed food only at night to 
avoid bombardment. 
Despite these conditions, from 1975 
onwards there was a steady develop- 
ment of a system of local govemment in 
the TPLF-controlled areas that were 
historically characterized by feudalism. 
This system consisted of democratically 
electedvillagecomrnittees, whichin turn 
elected representatives to district 
(woreda) committees. These woreda com- 
mittees, known as Baitos, became the 
foundation of a avilian government in 
Tigray. They also implemented a series 
of social welfare and agricultural devel- 
opment programs initiated by the TPLF. 
The Baitos also formeda partnership with 
REST in managingrelief operations. As a 
result, REST was able to obtain regular 
and detailed accounts of the rural peo- 
ple's needs and priorities, while the 
Baitos were responsible for carrying out 
relief distribution. 
The Famine Crisis of 1984-85 
In 1983, a Drought Commission was es- 
tablished in TPLF-controlled areas of 
Tigray to manage the drought crisis. At 
that time, 85 percent of Tigray was ad- 
ministered by the TPLF, including al- 
most all of the rural areas, while 
govemment forces were confined to gar- 
risoned towns along the main highway. 
The Drought Commission included 
REST, the TPLF's public administration 
department and the Baitos. Meanwhile, 
the number of people who were inter- 
nally displaced by the drought in- 
creased. In 1980, REST recorded some 
6,000 households from central Tigray 
that were displaced to the western re- 
gion. By July 1983, this number had risen 
to over 400,000 people. 
In response to the growing disaster, 
theDrought Commission held a seriesof 
consultations with Baito representatives 
throughout Tigray to discuss how 
people could obtain food. One possibility 
was migration from the most drought- 
stricken central and eastern regions to 
REST's emergency centres and food 
distribution sites in the west. However, 
REST's capacity to support people in 
western Tigray was already constrained 
by the limited aid resources at its 
disposal. People were thus encouraged 
to try to find jobs in the west or any other 
areas that traditionally offered seasonal 
employment. Meanwhile, REST 
attempted to obtain more support from 
donors for its relief programs. 
At the same time, it was clear that the 
grain purchasing and food distribution 
programs were insufficient. Conse- 
quently, the TPLF issued a number of 
requests to the international community 
to support the safe passage of relief as- 
sistance from the towns into the famine- 
affected countryside. Several countries 
responded and attempted to negotiate a 
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safe passage agreement with the Ethio- 
pian government. 
In 1984 many people who migrated 
in search of food returned home to try to 
cultivate their lands during the rainy 
season. by mid-1984, however, it became 
apparent that the drought would 
continue for the fourth consecutive year. 
Furthermore, there was a lack of rain not 
only in chronically drought-affected 
areas, but also in the traditionally 
surplus-producing western region. 
Tigray was now in the midst of a major 
catastrophe. 
Although TPLF and REST continued 
to call for a safe passage agreement, it 
became obvious that this would not 
happenin time to save hundreds of thou- 
sands of lives. Consequently, the 
Drought Commission advised people to 
attempt to obtain food from the interna- 
tional agencies working in the towns, 
even though this meant crossing mili- 
tary lines. In the early autumn of 1984, 
many people tried to obtain food from 
the towns. At that time, however, the 
Mengistu government relaunched its 
program of resettling people from the 
north to areas in southern Ethiopia. It 
was reported that people who entered 
the towns from TPLF-controlled areas 
were being rounded up for resettlement 
and forcefully separated from theirfami- 
lies by the army. These reports made 
people extremely wary about entering 
the towns. Thus hundreds of thousands 
of people in the central and eastern high- 
lands found themselves trapped with no 
possibility of obtaining food. 
The Exodus to Sudan 
The Drought Commission decided to 
provide an escape route from the famine 
zones. In September 1984, the comrnis- 
sion called another series of meetings 
with the Baitos to explain that the TPLF 
would establish a secure route to Sudan 
for those who decided to make the jour- 
ney. However, since REST could not pro- 
vide food for more than 65,000 people at 
any time, not all who decided to leave 
their villages could make the journey at 
once. Consequently, villages were asked 
to register for the exodus to Sudan only 
when all of their remaining resources 
were exhausted. Once people reached 
western Tigray, they would be sup- 
ported at REST transit centres, which 
were set up along the route. At the same 
time, REST notified the international 
community to expect a large-scale influx 
of Tigrayan refugees in eastern Sudan. 
Committees were formed in each 
village to look after medical care, regis- 
tration, food supplies and security for 
the journey. Once villagers were mobi- 
lized, they joined other villagers in the 
vicinity to form groups of approximately 
4,000. Each group was registered by the 
Drought Commission at a series of 
checkpoints across Tigray. Those who 
were unable to walk due to illness were 
also registered, so that they could be reu- 
nited with their families when their con- 
dition improved. 
Repatriation 
Approximately 200,000 people made the 
journey to Sudan from the end of 1984 to 
mid-1985. They left with the intention of 
returning to Tigray after the dry season 
and as soon as they were able to resume 
agricultural production during the next 
rainy season. Meanwhile, REST, to- 
gether with international NGOs, pro- 
vided assistance to those in reception 
centres in Sudan, while continuing its 
emergency programs inside Tigray. 
Originally, REST planned to repatri- 
ate 50,000 households from Sudan in 
1985. However, it became clear that there 
would not be enough food supplies or 
rehabilitation assistance through the 
cross-border program to support all 
Tigrayan refugees that year. After dis- 
cussions with Baito and village leaders in 
the refugee camps, REST changed its 
plans to repatriate 50,000 heads of house- 
holds who would return home first and 
cultivate during the growing season 
while their dependants returned in sub- 
sequent years. In this way, dependants 
could be assured of food supplies in the 
Sudanese camps, while active producers 
worked in agricultural production in Ti- 
gray. 
Meanwhile, conditions in the refugee 
camps were extremely poor and death 
rates were very high. Consequently, 
many dependants wanted to return 
home in 1985 together with the active 
producers. This was discussed among 
village and Baito representatives, and 
public meetings were held in the refugee 
camps where people were informed 
about the limited assistance REST could 
provide to returnees in 1985. Only those 
households who had no assets at all in 
Tigray were eligible to receive 
rehabilitation inputs from REST. 
Although it was described at that 
time as a "spontaneous return," therepa- 
triation to Tigray was organized in the 
same manner as the exodus. It occurred 
over a period of three years with the 
largest number of people returning 
home in 1986. Once people returned 
home, they were registered as returnees 
from Sudan and reintegrated into the 
ongoing relief and rehabilitation pro- 
grams. 
In late 1987, after the repatriation 
program was successfully completed, 
another cycle of severe drought and crop 
failure occurred throughout Tigray. 
Once again, a series of meetings were 
held with Baito representatives to dis- 
cuss various options as to how to man- 
age the new crisis. 
A return migration to Sudan was one 
of the choices put before the people. 
However, they preferred to remain in 
their villages rather than repeat the 
movement of 1985. Thus, TPLF and 
REST decided to expand as quickly as 
possible the transport routes of the cross- 
border operation from western Tigray to 
the central highlands in order to manage 
the renewed threat of famine. This was 
feasible because road construction was 
done the previous year. Also, it was 
hoped that REST'S increased trucking 
capacity, together with an intensified 
grain purchasing program, would en- 
able enough food supplies from western 
Tigray to reach those who were inter- 
nally displaced. Furthermore, REST re- 
quested additional assistance from relief 
operations in government controlled ar- 
eas to help support the numbers within 
the TPLF-controlled areas. 
With increased support frominterna- 
tional NGOs, this strategy was success- 
ful. Most people were able to remain on 
their land during the dry season, avoid 
disruptive internal migrations and 
prepare their fields for cultivation. As a 
result, there was no significant migration 
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from Tigray to Sudan that year or the 
following year. 
Issues to Consider 
I would now like to consider some of the 
key issues from these experiences. The 
first issue concerns the relationship be- 
tween the Drought Commission and the 
Baitos. Without the partnership between 
these two groups, it would have been 
virtually impossible to manage a coordi- 
nated response to the famine disaster of 
1985. One of the most important aspects 
of this partnership was that the Baito sys- 
tem enabled REST and the TPLF to con- 
sult with rural communities throughout 
Tigray at each stage of the escalating cri- 
sis. As a result of these consultations, 
policy decisions were made based on the 
experiences and concerns of those af- 
fected by the disaster. In this way, an 
operational framework was created in 
rural Tigray where people were able to 
participate in the decisions that affected 
them. This participation, in turn, created 
a sense of determination and confidence 
that mobilized people to survive the fam- 
ine with whatever meagre means were 
available to them. It also meant that peo- 
ple workedactivelywith REST andTPLF 
rather than wait passively for these or- 
ganizations to solve their problems. As a 
participant in these events, one of the 
most moving experiences I witnessed 
was the tremendous spirit of the people 
at one of the worst times in their history. 
The second issue concerns the role of 
international NGOs in supporting the 
relief operation in the TPLF-controlled 
areas. During the 1985 famine, REST's 
relief operation was not supported by 
multilateral organizations that were 
supporting relief programs in govern- 
ment-controlled areas. This had to do 
with the politicization of aid to the war 
zones. Consequently, REST's primary 
supporters were international NGOs. 
Those NGOs who supported REST's 
programs then and in later years demon- 
strated a flexibility and humanitarian- 
ism that saved many lives by providing 
REST withemergency aid, while respect- 
ing REST's management of the emer- 
gency according to REST's assessment 
and knowledge of the situation. In turn, 
REST welcomed the regular monitoring 
of its program by representatives of in- 
ternational NGOs, which ensured and 
facilitated its accountability as a humani- 
tarian organization. 
This flexible and pragmatic approach 
towards aid delivery has been 
duplicated in other similar situations. 
This kind of approach can also counter- 
balance the lack of flexibility in multilat- 
eral institutions in conflict situations. 
Multilateral institutions' inflexibility 
was particularly noticeable during the 
1985 repatriation of Tigrayans from 
Sudan. Multilateral organizations, 
particularly the UNHCR, prioritized 
their institutional mandates and respect 
for the concept of state sovereignty at the 
expense of the people's actual needs. It is 
thus important to recommend that mul- 
tilateral institutions shift their priorities 
to ensure that the people's needs are 
placed first before abstract concepts or 
organizational procedures. Flexibility 
can also ensure cooperation within the 
international community. Furthermore, 
this approach should be broadened to 
include not only UN agencies but na- 
tional and international NGOs as well. 
Finally, let me make one final point 
concerning the repatriation of Tigrayan 
refugees from Sudan. As mentioned 
earlier, this movement was part of a 
broader survival strategy of poor people 
who knew the importance of returning 
to their land if they were ever to regain 
economic self-sufficiency. In effect, this 
was an extension of the participatory 
relief management in Tigray. Return to 
Tigray was facilitated by a participatory 
framework that enabled the returnees to 
have confidence in their future. At the 
time, aid officials in Sudan misinter- 
preted this confidence for foolhardiness 
in the refugees' decision to return. 
Instead, people were able to return home 
and regain their confidence. 
Thus in the Tigrayan case, the 
people's participation was essential for 
successful repatriation. This is especially 
true since very few resources were avail- 
able to either REST or the TPLF. Within 
the context of Ethiopia, involving those 
who are affected in a problem-solving 
process will ensure that solutions are 
implemented in the most positive way, 
even when resources are scarce. 
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